ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is one of the most important technologies in this decade. This technology allows identifying the tagging objectives wirelessly using transponders queried by readers through a wireless channel. RFID technology has widely been used in applications such as public transportation [1] , supply chain management [2] , e-passports [3] , location tracking systems [4] and access control systems [5] .
There are three main components in a RFID system: tags, readers and a backend server. Each tag contains a microchip, antenna and a certain amount of computational and storage capabilities. A reader queries tags to obtain tag contents through wireless communications and sends this information to the backend server through a secure channel. The backend server is composed of a database and some processors [6] . Since the passive tags have low-cost and low computational capabilities, there are information leakage and many security flaws in passive RFID systems. Inasmuch as the passive tags cannot perform complicated cryptography algorithms. The main threats of a RFID system are as following.
• Tag and reader impersonation: A malicious adversary masquerades as a legitimate tag and tries to use system services by means of reader deception. On the other hand, a legitimate reader is masqueraded by the attacker and he eventually gets access to the stored secrets of tag [7] .
• Man-in-the middle attack: As tags and readers use the wireless channel to communicate each other, so this kind of attack can be occurred. In this situation the attacker intervenes between a legal tag and a legitimate reader and exchanges or modifies the authentication messages [8] .
• Tag tracing and tracking: An adversary traces and tracks legitimate tags from their protocol interactions. The notions untraceability, backward untraceability and forward untraceabilityare related to this attack [9, 10] .
• Desynchronization: This is an active attack in which a malicious adversary tries to cause the tag and the reader to update inconsistent values and make tag disabled [11] . In recent years, many researchers have tried to propose lightweight and secure authentication protocols [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] , but unfortunately many vulnerabilities have been found in their schemes [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38] . Recently Fu et al. [39] proposed a scalable RFID mutual authentication and Li et al. [40] suggested a mutual authentication protocol for RFID communication.
In this paper, we analyze these protocols and will present three different attacks on FWCFP protocol including desynchronization attack, attack on untraceability in two methods and attack on backward untraceability. Furthermore, one attack is applied on LWJX protocol which is attack on untraceability. The remainder of this paper is organized as following. Related works are studied in section 2.We explain the privacy model for RFID systems in section 3. The FWCFP protocol is summarized as section 4. Our attacks on FWCFP protocol are discussed in section 5. We explain the LWJX protocol in section 6. The security analysis of the LWJX protocol is in section 7 and finally section 8 is assigned to conclusion.The notations in table1 are used throughout this paper. 
RELATED WORKS
In this section we briefly study some authentication protocols which have been proposed to provide secure communications in RFID systems. Dimitriou proposed an RFID authentication scheme that uses a challenge-response mechanism [39] .Since the tag identifier remains constant between two successful sessions, this protocol is vulnerable to tracking attacks and tag impersonation attack. In [40] , a lightweight authentication protocol is proposed by Ohkubo et. Al. This scheme provides indistinguishability and forward security characteristics. The scheme is based on a hash chain and uses two dissimilar hash functions H and G. This protocol does not provide protection against an adversary that tries to de-synchronize the server and the tags, consequently resulting in a DoS attack. Juels [36] showed that cloning and counterfeiting attacks are applied simply on EPC tags. He proposed an unclonable authentication protocol to solve these problems. However, Duc et al. [20] have presented some weaknesses related to privacy and information leakage in Juels scheme.
In [41] , Karthikeyan and Nesterenko suggested a security protocol without complex cryptographic primitives. Only XOR and matrix operations were used in their scheme. Chien and Chen [12] showed that this protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks and does not assure the untraceability property.
A mutual authentication protocol under the EPC C-1 G-2 standard was proposed by Chien and Chen [12] . They had used simple XOR, CRC and PRNG in their scheme. In [12] each tag needs to keep an EPC code and two secret keys ‫ܭ‬ , ܲ . Secret key ‫ܭ‬ is used to tag authentication and secret key ܲ is used to reader authentication. Both ‫ܭ‬ and ܲ are updated in each round whereas EPC code is permanent. For each tag secret values ‫ܭ‬ ௗ , ܲ ௗ , ‫ܭ‬ ௪ , ܲ ௪ , EPC and DATA are stored in database. The protocol is initialed with sending a random number ܰ ோ by the reader. As a result, the tag replies with (M1, ܰ ் ) where M1=CRC(EPC॥ܰ ோ ॥ܰ ் ‫ܭ⨁)‬ . After receiving the tag's response, the database searches for finding the correct tag and its corresponding information ‫ܭ{(‬ ௗ , ܲ ௗ } or ‫ܭ{‬ ௪ , ܲ ௪ }). Thenthe database computes M2=CRC(EPC॥ܰ ் )⨁ܲ ௫ (x= old or new) and sends tag M2. At that point the database updates its secret keys as following:
The tag receives M2 and checks whether M2⨁ܲ =CRC(EPC॥ܰ ் ). If it satisfies, the tag authenticates the database and updates ‫ܭ‬ and ܲ the same as with the database, else it terminates the protocol.
Lopez et al. [37] showed some weaknesses of Chien and Chen's protocol including tag and reader impersonation and desynchronization attack. They also showed that this protocol does not guarantee forward security and it is vulnerable to tracing attack. Han and Kwon [14] also presented a desynchronization attack and two tag impersonation attacks on Chien and Chen's protocol in new methods. These attacks were mainly based on weak secure properties of CRC.
RFIDUNTRACEABLE PRIVACY MODEL
Some privacy models have been proposed by researchers to evaluation of RFID protocols [9, 42, 43, 44] . In [42] , Juels and Weis gave a formal definition of the privacy and untraceability model. The same definition is described by Ouafi and Phan in their work presented in ISPEC'08 [44] and we will use this model to analyze the SRP protocol. The model that has been described in [44] is summarized as follows.
The protocol parties are tags (T) and readers (R) which interact in protocol sessions. In this model an adversaryAcontrols the communication channel between all parties by interacting either passively or actively with them. The adversaryAis allowed to run the following queries:
Execute (R, T, i) query. This query models the passive attacks. The adversary A eavesdrops on the communication channel between T and R and gets read access to the exchanged messages between the parties in session i of a truthful protocol execution.
Send (U, V, m, i) query. This query models activeattacks by allowing the adversary Ato impersonate some reader U ∈R(respectively tag V∈T) in some protocol session iand send a message mof its choice to an instance of some tag V ∈T(respectively reader U ∈R ).
Furthermore the adversary A is allowed to block or alert the message m that is sent from U to V (respectively V to U) in session i of a truthful protocol execution.
Corrupt(T, ‫ܭ‬
ᇱ ) query. This query allows the adversaryA to learn the stored secretK of the tagT∈T, and which further sets the stored secret to‫ܭ‬ ᇱ . Corrupt query means that the adversary has physical access to the tag, i.e., the adversary can read and tamper with the tag's permanent memory.
• Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. This query does not correspond to any of A's abilities, but it is necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for sessioni, a random bit b∈{0, 1} is generated and then, A is givenT b ∈ {T o , T 1 ). Informally, Awins if he can guess the bit b. Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game g played between an adversary A and a collection of the reader and the tag instances. The game gisdivided into three following phases:
Learning phase:A is given tags T o and T 1 randomly and he is able to send any Execute, Send and Corrupt queries of its choice to T 0 , T 1 and reader.
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T 0 , T 1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given a tag T b from the set {T 0 , T 1 }.Acontinues making any Execute, and Send queries at will. 
FWCFPPROTOCOL
Fu et al. proposed a RFID private mutual authentication in [45] . We summarize the proposed protocol as follows. IDT and K are static ID and key with 96 bit length which are shared between each tag and the reader. Each tag also has an IDTA which is an alias with 96 bit length. The reader has a symmetric encryption function ‫ܧ‬ ೞ (.) with secret key ‫ܭ‬ ௦ which is known only by it. The reader uses ‫ܧ‬ ೞ (.) to encrypt and decrypt IDTA. In each execution of protocol, IDTA is updated as IDTA = ‫ܧ‬ ೞ (IDT || rand0) where rand0 is a random number generated by the reader. The steps of the proposed protocol are as following. 1) The reader generates a random number rand1, and sends it to the tag.
2) The reader generates a random number rand1, and sends it to the tag.
3) The tag generates a random number rand2,computes H(K || rand1) and sends {IDTA, H(K || rand1),rand2} to the reader. H (.) is a secure hash function. 4) The reader decrypts IDTA using the secret key ݇ ௦ to get the permanent ID of tag-IDT, and then retrieves the shared key K between the tag and the reader by IDT. It computes H (K || rand1) and checks whether the computed value equals to the received one. If it matches, the tag is authenticated, otherwise the authentication has failed. If the tag is authenticated successfully, the reader generates a new random number rand0 ᇱ , computes IDTA ᇱ as:
Then the reader computes the values A and B as:
It also computes H (K || rand2) and sends (H (K || rand2), A, B) to the tag. 5) The tag checks H(K || rand2) to authenticate the reader. If it matches, the reader is authenticated; otherwise the whole authentication has failed. If the reader is authenticated successfully, the tag computes H(K || rand 1 || rand 2) and H(K || rand 2 || rand1). Then it computes two new aliases as:
If IDTA1= IDTA2, the tag stores IDTA1 as the new alias IDTA and sends OK to the reader.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE FWCFP PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the FWCFP protocol [45] from the security point of view. We have found many security vulnerabilities in this protocol,so we present four different attacks on synchronization and untraceability of this protocol. 
Attack on Synchronization
We have found a fundamental weakness in this protocol. An attacker can exploit from this weakness and desynchronize a legal tag T i and the legitimate reader. The procedure of the attack is as following.
1) The adversary eavesdrops a valid session between the legal tag T i and the reader. He lets parties send the first and the second message safely, but he changes the third message and modifies the values A, B to AӘ , ‫ܤ‬ ᇱ as:
where IDTA is an arbitrary bit string with 96 bit length. Then the adversary sends (A', B', H(K || rand2)) to Ti as the third message.
2) Upon receiving the third message,T i computes H(K || rand2), checks whether the computed value equals to the received one. Because it matches, T i authenticates the adversary and computes IDTA1, IDTA2 as:
Because IDTA1 = IDTA2, T i updates the stored IDTA as:
At the next sessions, whenever T i wants to authenticate itself to the reader, it sends IDTA ⊕IDTA to the reader. After decryptionIDTA ⊕ IDTA , the reader extracts IDT' which is not equal to IDT, so the reader does not find IDT' in its database, therefore the reader always rejects T i and they have no way to resynchronization.
Attack on Untraceability
A main weakness in designing this protocol is the fact that the term H (shared key || a random number) has the same structure in the second and the third flow of the protocol. An adversary can exploit this weakness and trace a tag as following.
Learning phase:The adversary is given tag T 0 at random. A eavesdrops a perfect session between T 0 and a legitimate reader. He gets the values rand2 and H (K 0 || rand2) from the first and the second flows of the protocol respectively by an Execute query. He reserves these values.
Challenge phase: A is giventagT b ∈{T 0 , T 1 } randomly. He starts a new session with T b and sends rand2 to it as the first message by Send query. T b responds with:
(H (K b || rand2), IDTA, rand'2) and the adversary reserves H (K b || rand2).
Guess phase:
If H (K b || rand2) = H (K 0 || rand2), the adversary outputs ܾ ᇱ = 0 and guesses T 0 , otherwise he outputs ܾ ᇱ =1 and guesses T 1 . The advantage of the adversary is:
By having H (K 0 || rand2), if T b =T 0 , then with the probability of 1 we have H (K b || rand2) = H(K 0 || rand2), but if T b =T 1 , then with the probability of 2 ି we have H (K b || rand2) = H (K 0 || rand2), because H (.) is a bit string with length n.
Attack on Backward Untraceability
We use the notion backward untraceability from [8] and use the privacy model from [44] to show that the FWCFP protocol doesn't assure the backward untraceability.
Learning phase: A is given tag T 0 at random, he sends T 0 Corrupt query at time t 1 and gets the secrets of the T 0 at time t 1 as ( ‫ܭ‬ 
Because the adversary can compute H(K 0 || rand1), he owns this value. By having H (K 0 || rand1), if T b =T 0 , then with the probability of 1 we have H (K b || rand1) = H (K 0 || rand1), but if T b =T 1 , then with the probability of 2 ି we have
is a bit string with length n.
LWJX PROTOCOL
Li et al. proposed an authentication protocol for secure RFID communication [46] . The proposed protocol is as it follows.Each tag stores an initial ID and a secret key K shared by the tag and the reader. The reader keeps the following information for each tag: ID with initial value same as to tag's ID, hash value of ID new with the initial value of H (ID), hash value ofID old with the initial value is empty, new value of secret key K new with the initial value of K, old value of secret key K old with the initial value is empty. The parameter M holds howmany times a tag has had unsuccessful sessions. Two hash functions H and G are implemented on each tag and on the reader. The procedure of authentication is as follows.Each tag stores an initial ID and a secret key K shared by the tag and the reader. 
Attack on Untraceability
We give our privacy analysis on LWJX protocol according to the privacy model discussed in [18] which has been explained it in section III. We show that the LWJX protocol does not have untraceability.
Learning phase:
The adversary is given tag T 0 at random. He masquerades as a legitimate reader and starts a new session with tag T 0 by sending Send query. He sends Rr 1 to T 0 and gets its response as (H ‫ܦܫ(‬ ), H (K 0 || Rr 1 ), Rt). The adversary reserves these values and terminates the session to avoid the T 0 updating. Because |H(.)| = n, we have H(ID 0 )=H(ID 1 ) with the probability of 2 ି , so the adversary can guess the correct tag with the probability of 1 െ 2 ି .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed some security and privacy vulnerabilities of the RFID authentication protocols proposed by Fu et al [45] and Li et al [46] . We also present the desynchronization attack and tag tracing on [45] . In desynchronization attack, an adversary can easily change the third message transmitted in protocol and desynchronize the target tag and the legitimate reader. We also presented the privacy analysis of this protocol in a formal privacy model. We showed the FWCFP protocol doesn't assure untraceability, backward untraceability and forward untraceability. We also presented some attacks on privacy and anonymity of [46] . It has shown that untraceability and forward untraceability aren't assured by this protocol. 
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